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ETHICS CONSULT
E-Ethics
The fit between laws regu-
lating professional ethics
and the means of conduct-
ing business, particularly
telecommunications and
computer technology, has
become tenuous. Is elec-
tronic transmission of
information less secure
than time-tried telephone
or written communica-
tion? Is there less privacy?
Is attorney-client privilege
endangered by use of the
messages sent over the
Internet or e-mail? Recent
legal decisions concerning
these issues are examined
here, which may provide
guidance on liability of
professionals and regula-
tion of their behavior.
By Michael K.
McChrystal
Michael K. McChrystal is a profes-
sor of law at Marquette University
Law School, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, and a consultant on
legal ethics to law firms, corpora-
tions, and government agencies.
T he law of profession-al ethics, like muchof the law generally,
has not been updated
to reflect technologi-
cal advances of the information
age. A recent unpublished deci-
sion by the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals illustrates the problem
well. In Walgreen Co. v. Wiscon-
sin Pharmacy Examining Board,'
a pharmacy was censured for
accepting prescriptions by e-mail.
The governing Wisconsin statute
permits pharmacies to accept
prescriptions from physicians in
a writing signed by the physician
or orally over the phone. The
pharmacy board concluded that
an e-mail transmission of a pre-
scription is a writing and there-
fore must be signed. The court of
appeals disagreed, based on the
"simple facts of computer trans-
mission." The court character-
ized the computer communica-
tion this way: "The prescription
is put into a computer as text and
the message is then electronically
transmitted to the pharmacy's
terminal, much as a telephone
call-or a facsimile-would be."2
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As such, it is more akin to a tele-
phoned prescription and need
not be signed. The court even
noted the superiority of sending
in prescriptions by e-mail:
"[C]omputer transmission pre-
sents an advantage over an oral
prescription order-where the
listener must record the order on
paper-by greatly reducing the
risk of misunderstanding because
the prescription appears in writ-
ten form on the pharmacy's ter-
minal."I
Wisconsin Statutes Section
450.11(1) provides: "Dispensing.
No person may dispense any
prescribed drug or device except
upon the prescription order of a
[physician]. All prescription
orders shall specify the date of
issue, the name and address of
the patient, the name and
address of the [physician], the
name and quantity of the drug
prescribed, directions for the use
of the drug and, if the order is
written by the [physician], the
signature of the [physician]. Any
oral prescription order shall be
immediately reduced to writing
by the pharmacist and filed."
New technologies fit more or
less uneasily into legal rules
designed for traditional forms of
communication, as the court of
appeals decision in Walgreen
shows. E-mail is neither a tele-
phone/voice communication nor
a written (and signed) communi-
cation, although it shares fea-
tures with each. Yet the
Walgreen court was forced by
the statute before it to decide the
case on the basis of which of
these two different forms of
communication e-mail resem-
bled more.
Confidentiality, E-Mail,
Cordless Phones, and Other
Methods of Communication
The law of legal ethics has begun
to grapple with a number of
technology-related issues. Con-
siderable attention has been
given to the newer modes of
communication, including cell
phones and e-mail. A recent
ethics opinion from the
American Bar Association'
(ABA) puts the efficacy of these
newer modes of communication
in context.
The ABA opinion notes that
all methods of communication
are vulnerable, in some measure,
to misdirection, interception,
theft, or eavesdropping. After
considering the relative vulnera-
bility of mail service, telephone
communication, facsimile trans-
mission, and e-mail, the commit-
tee concluded that e-mail com-
pares very favorably to the other
methods, even when it is not
encrypted and is sent over the
Internet.
The ABA suggests greatest
caution in the use of cellular and
cordless telephones, which rely
on radio waves that can be easily
intercepted. When an attorney
uses an insecure form of commu-
nication, there may be a breach
of the duty of confidentiality. In
extreme cases, the attorney-client
privilege may even be at risk.'
In deciding what form of
communication to use, the ABA
opinion suggests that the attor-
ney should consult with the
client and take into considera-
tion the relative sensitivity of the
information to be communicat-
ed and the relative security and
efficiency of the various alterna-
tives available.
For each method of commu-
nication, the risks should be con-
sidered. For example, facsimiles
can be misdirected by the slip of
a finger in dialing a 10-digit
number. Moreover, in many set-
tings, facsimiles are delivered by
secretaries, mailroom workers,
or other intermediaries who
have an opportunity to learn
their contents. Telephone calls
are vulnerable to eavesdropping
and low-tech (though illegal)
mechanical interception. Mail
services occasionally lose or mis-
direct a package, and some com-
mercial services reserve the right
to inspect packages under cer-
tain circumstances.
In other words, every method
of communication has its risks,
and these risks should be consid-
ered, in light of the specific cir-
cumstances of the parties, when
sensitive information is being
communicated between attorney
and client. Consideration of
risks may be especially impor-
tant with older clients who
receive communications in cir-
cumstances that afford little pri-
vacy. If a client's mail routinely is
read by others and if telephone
conversations rarely afford the
client privacy, special steps, such
as a personal visit in the home or
office, may be required when
sensitive information must be
communicated.
When a Communication
Goes Astray
With so many communications
being sent to and from law
offices by so many means, some
are bound to go astray. The tra-
ditional rule is that once the con-
tents of a document become pub-
lic, the document's confidentiali-
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ty and privilege are destroyed.
The trend, however, is to protect
the confidentiality of a docu-
ment, even if it has somehow
reached an unintended recipient,
when it is shown that reasonable
precautions were taken to pro-
tect the secrecy of the document.
This newer rule reduces the
incentive for a third party to
secure or disclose another's con-
fidential document in bad faith.
Of course, negligent disclo-
sure of a confidential communi-
cation generally destroys the
communication's confidentiality.
In Joyner v. Southeastern Penn.
Transp. Authority,' a personal
injury plaintiff who was intend-
ing to call his own lawyer inad-
vertently dialed defense counsel's
number instead. When the client
got the opposing counsel's voice
mail, he left the following mes-
sage:
Brad, this is William Joyner,
Jean Joyner's husband.. .. Call
me and let me know can I sing
with my group again. If I can
sing, call and let me know. If I
can't sing, call me and let me
know, okay? I don't want to
make no more mistakes, cause
they're gonna be following me
now. So if I can sing, call me let
me know. If I can't sing, call me
let me know, okay? . .. Thank
you.'
The court determined that the
client did not take reasonable
steps to ensure that he was com-
municating with his own attor-
ney, and the communication was
held to be outside the attorney-
client privilege.
Lawyer Liability for
Invasions of Privacy
Lawyers are information gather-
ers, among many other things.
Information gathering increas-
ingly has risks of liability, proba-
bly because it is done more per-
vasively and profitably than ever
before. Privacy claims are some-
times available to persons who
feel aggrieved by information
about them becoming known.
A smattering of cases has
begun to appear in which
lawyers may be liable to non-
clients for invading their privacy
in the course of gathering infor-
mation in aid of their clients.
Two recent cases involved
lawyers who improperly secured
a third party's medical records,
in each case involving mental
health treatment. In Mandziara
v. Canulli,o an Illinois lawyer
failed to follow the statutorily
prescribed procedure for sub-
poenas of mental health records.
The records, which concerned
the opposing party in a custody
dispute, were subpoenaed for
delivery directly to the court
with jurisdiction in the case. The
applicable statute" requires a
court order before mental health
records may be subpoenaed. The
statute provides a cause of
action for persons harmed by a
violation of the statute, and a
viable claim was therefore stated
against the lawyer involved.
Susan S. v. Israelsl2 is similar
in that a valid claim for damages
was asserted against a California
criminal lawyer for improperly
viewing the mental health
records of the complaining wit-
ness in a sexual battery case. The
victim's treatment facility mis-
takenly delivered her records to
defense counsel rather than to
the court. Defense counsel read
the records, transmitted them to
the defense psychiatrist, and
used them in cross-examining
the witness. The court held that
the lawyer acted tortiously in
continuing to view the records
once he knew what they were.
Valid privacy claims also
have been asserted against
lawyers who improperly secure
consumer credit reports involv-
ing nonclients in violation of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act."
Bakker v. McKinnon," a recent
Eighth Circuit decision, involved
a personal injury plaintiff's
lawyer in a dental malpractice
action who secured consumer
credit reports concerning the
defendant in the action. In the
resulting invasion-of-privacy suit
against the lawyer, a valid claim
was stated because the lawyer
did not secure the report for one
of the limited number of purpos-
es permissible under the statute.
Generally, the statute permits
consumer credit reports only in
relation to consumer transac-
tions.
In elder law practice, most
information gathering probably
will concern the elder whose
affairs are at issue. Generally, the
elder will be the client who has
consented to the information
being gathered. If someone other
than the elder is the client, how-
ever-for example, if the lawyer
represents family members
rather than the elder-the risk of
wrongfully invading the elder's
privacy is greater, and greater
caution should be used.
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Advertising Legal Services
on the Internet
Ethics law regulates lawyer
advertising and solicitation of
clients, irrespective of the adver-
tising medium used. The Internet
is, of course, a rapidly growing
medium of commerce, for
lawyers as well as others.
Although few cases have been
decided, bar association ethics
opinions are virtually unani-
mous in finding that efforts to
attract clients on the Internet are
subject to the usual advertising
and solicitation regulation.
Having said that, it should be
noted that regulations contem-
plating different media are often
a poor fit for the Internet. This is
highlighted by an extensive
analysis by the American Bar
Association Commission on
Advertising, which issued its
"White Paper on Internet"
advertising in the summer of
1998.
One of the problems in
applying general regulations to
Internet advertising is the
assumption that the ad will be in
a fixed form on paper, video-
tape, or cassette. Web sites often
have a more fluid quality, with
frequent changes both on-site
and to linked sites. To illustrate
the problem, ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, Rule
7.2, requires lawyers to retain
copies of their advertisements
for two years, along with a
record of their dissemination.
While this requirement may not
be too burdensome for print
advertising, it poses a host of
problems for advertising
through a constantly changing
Web site with links to other con-
stantly changing Web sites.
An example of another prob-
lem can be found in the Model
Rules distinction between in-
person and live telephone solici-
tation of business, on the one
hand, and written or recorded
solicitation, on the other." How
does this play out in the context
of interactive Web sites, linked
discussion groups, and chat
rooms?
The ABA Commission White
Paper calls for further study and
possible rule revision to clarify
how advertising regulations
should apply to new electronic
media.
Other Postings on the
Internet
The Internet is not solely com-
mercial in its content, which can
be clearly seen from the many
lawyer and law firm Web sites
that provide a wealth of infor-
mation and commentary about
the law. Elder law associations
and elder lawyers have joined in
making these important contri-
butions." Noncommercial post-
ings on the Internet are probably
not subject to regulations gov-
erning lawyer advertising. Other
issues may arise, however.
In Seidl v. Greentree Mort-
gage Co.," counsel in a business
tort case published statements
about the case on its Web site. In
addressing the resulting defama-
tion claim and the law firm's
assertion that its publication of
defamatory statements in the
context of a judicial proceeding
is privileged, the court held:
These communications were
made for the express purpose of
publicizing the lawsuit. Their
dissemination via the Internet
created a worldwide audience.
There is no evidence that any of
the viewers had any connection
to the proceeding, except as
potentially concerned observers.
... As was stated in Kennedy v.
Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d
54 (Md. Ct. App. 1962): "An
attorney who wishes to litigate
his case in the press will do so
at his own risk. We hold that
[the attorney] had no absolute
privilege in regard to the state-
ment made by him to the news-
paper." Similarly, in this case,
an attorney who wishes to liti-
gate her case in the press and
via the Internet does so at her
own risk. There is no absolute
privilege under Colorado law
for statements by an attorney
or by a party made to the press
or gratuitous statements posted
on the Internet for the purpose
of publicizing the case to per-
sons who have no connection
to the proceeding except as
potentially interested observers."
Practicing Law Beyond
Jurisdictional Boundaries
Lawyers increasingly discover
that their law practice has a mul-
tistate dimension to it, even if
that is not their goal. In an elder
law practice, this can come
about because clients divide
their time between seasonal
homes or retire to different
states. Or it may result from the
lawyer's reputation for excel-
lence in handling a particular
type of problem, which results in
consultations or referrals from
various jurisdictions.
The law governing multistate
practice has never been very
clear, except in the limited con-
text of pro bac vice admission in
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litigated matters. A recent
California case has engendered
concern about the implications
when legal matters draw a
lawyer's attention across state
lines.
In Birbrower, Montalbano,
Condon & Frank v. Superior
Court,'" the California Supreme
Court held that a New York law
firm could not recover fees from
a California client for work per-
formed in California that
amounted to the unauthorized
practice of law in that state. The
court looked to a host of factors
in concluding that the law firm's
work constituted the unautho-
rized practice of law in
California, including that the
client was a California resident,
much of the work was physical-
ly performed in California, and
California law applied to the
matter. The court offered the fol-
lowing observations in assessing
whether a representation will
involve "sufficient contact" to
render it unauthorized practice
in California:
[O]ne may practice law in the
state in violation of section
6125 although not physically
present here by advising a
California client on California
law in connection with a
California legal dispute by tele-
phone, fax, computer, or other
modern technological means.
Conversely, although we
decline to provide a compre-
hensive list of what activities
constitute sufficient contact
with the state, we do reject the
notion that a person automati-
cally practices law "in
California" whenever that per-
son practices California law
anywhere, or "virtually" enters
the state by telephone, fax, e-
mail, or satellite.20
Unfortunately, the California
court establishes that there is a
real possibility that non-
California attorneys are engag-
ing in unethical and unlawful
conduct when they practice law
in the state, without offering
meaningful guidance as to what
activities that includes. Clarity
on this issue, in California and
elsewhere, is long overdue."
Conclusion
The complex of technological
and social developments we call
"The Information Age" leads to
constantly evolving tools and
strategies for delivering legal ser-
vices. The field of elder law is
itself an example of this evolu-
tion-it is a reorganization of
the way people think about the
need for and delivery of legal
services. Profound changes in
the ways that legal services are
performed create an enormous
challenge for the legal regime
that regulates lawyer conduct.
Good minds are addressing these
issues throughout the country,
but much uncharted water
remains.
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